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ABSTRACT
Relative deprivation theory suggests that discrimination increases
the risk of violence. While religious armed conﬂicts have been
increasing in sub-Saharan Africa, eﬀects of religious discrimination
have rarely been investigated. Using the new Religion and State
dataset and other sources, this contribution investigates this ques-
tion in a two-level analysis. The analysis yields three main results.
First, religious discrimination has been increasing over the last
15 years but in interregional comparison sub-Saharan Africa has
a low level of discrimination. Second, at the cross-country level
there is a signiﬁcant correlation between religious discrimination
and armed conﬂict over religious content. Third, looking closer at
four pertinent country cases (the Comoros, the Gambia, Mali and
Mauritania) reveals that discrimination is probably not a direct
driver of religious conﬂicts. High levels of discrimination are
embedded in problematic state-religion relations and existing
cleavages become mobilised along religious lines through trans-
national inﬂuences and geography.
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Introduction
In recent years, armed conﬂicts with religious overtones in countries like the Central African
Republic (CAR), Mali, Nigeria and Somalia have been on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa. One
possible explanation of this rise is religious discrimination. According to Ted Gurr’s relative
deprivation theory (Gurr 1970), discrimination should breed grievances and hence result in
aggression and violence. The theory is straightforward and plausible. Feeling marginalised
creates frustration and the resulting aggression may lead to violence. At closer look at the
literature however reveals that the relationship is empirically not as evident as assumed. For
more than two decades it could not be conﬁrmed (see Basedau, Pfeiﬀer, and Johannes 2016;
Brush 1996; Fox 2004; Fox, Bader, and McClure 2017). Only a few years ago, a string of articles
showed that ethnic groups that are politically excluded tend to be more involved in conﬂicts
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010).
The jury is out on religious groups. While some evidence suggests that ethno-religious
minorities havea slightly increased conﬂict risk (AkbabaandTaydas 2011), group level analyses
show that discrimination, grievances and violence are largely unconnected (Basedau, Pfeiﬀer,
and Vüllers 2016; Fox, Bader, and McClure 2017). Africa South of the Sahara is rarely
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investigated in detail and if religion and conﬂict are analysed, religious discrimination seems to
play a minor role (Basedau, Pfeiﬀer, and Vüllers 2016; Basedau et al. 2011, 2017). The new
Religion and State Round 3 (RAS3) dataset and new data on religious conﬂicts now oﬀer the
opportunity to re-examine this question in more detail. To what extent does religious dis-
crimination explain the occurrence of ‘religious’ armed conﬂict in sub-Saharan Africa? What
other factors have to be taken into account?
This study proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst engage in an overview on the levels and trends in
religious discrimination and religious armed conﬂicts. We subsequently engage in multilevel
analysis in order to identify eﬀects and mechanisms: At a regional level of analysis we test
whether religious discrimination is a signiﬁcant correlate of armed conﬂicts. The large N study
is complemented by a more in-depth analysis of four country cases that display a number of
similarities but show diﬀerent levels of religious discrimination and conﬂict occurrence. The
ﬁnal section summarises the results and outlines several challenges for future research.
Taking stock: patterns and trends in religious discrimination in sub-
Saharan Africa
According to the RAS dataset (Fox 2008, 2015), religious discrimination means constraints on
religious practice such as worshipping, diet, dress code, education and conversion. RAS3
includes 36 individual measures and oﬀers an additive index that sums up all individual scores
which enables an assessment of overall levels. If we have a closer look at patterns and trends
two ﬁndings are noteworthy. First, the overall level of religious discrimination is perhaps
surprisingly low in sub-Saharan Africa (see also Fox 2016). The region with the lowest religious
discrimination is not the western world but indeed sub-Saharan Africa. The trend shows an
increase of religious discrimination though. In 1990, discrimination averaged at around3.7, but
increased to – still rather moderate – 5.9 points in 2014. The development in sub-Saharan
Africa follows a worldwide trend (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Average religious discrimination scores per world regions, 1990–2014.
Y-axis indicates mxx values (0–35);mmx aggregates all individual forms of religious discrimination. Source: RAS3 data.
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There are noteworthy diﬀerences within sub-Saharan Africa. East Africa has witnessed
the strongest increase and has overtaken Central Africa as the subregion with the
highest score. West Africa and Southern Africa display rather low discrimination, with
Southern Africa showing a somewhat more pronounced increase in recent years.
Diﬀerences between countries are strong. Sudan leads by far, followed by the
Comoros, Mauritania, Eritrea, Nigeria and Somalia. We can observe particularly strong
increases in Eritrea (7–27 from 2001 to 2002), Nigeria (11–21 from 2000 to 2014) or
Mauritania (17–25 from 2005 to 2014). A number of countries show an extremely low,
virtually non-existent discrimination: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo-
Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, Niger and Senegal.1
The rise in religious discrimination in sub-Saharan Africa has coincided with a rise
in religious armed conﬂicts (see Basedau 2017). Before describing patterns, we
should clarify what ‘religious’ armed conﬂicts are. It has become increasingly
accepted to distinguish two socially relevant dimensions of religion for such con-
ﬂicts (Fox 2004; Svensson and Nilsson 2017): Warring factions can diﬀer over the
content of religion. For instance, they can hold diﬀerent views on the role of
religion in the state. Jihadist rebellions like in Mali or Nigeria are such theological
armed conﬂicts, as we call them, but they can occur in any faith. In contrast,
identity-based religious armed conﬂicts are characterised by a nominal diﬀerence
in religious group identity between the conﬂict parties. A conﬂict between
Christians and Muslims, like in the CAR, can thus be labelled an interreligious
armed conﬂict. Interreligious conﬂicts also include cases in which big sub-denomi-
nations like Protestants and Catholic Christians or Sunni and Shia Muslims clash.
Interreligious conﬂicts can also be, but are not necessarily over religious content. In
cases like the CAR there seems to be no pronounced content related, or ‘theologi-
cal’ dimension to the conﬂict. In Mali, the conﬂict parties have not diﬀered by
identity, as all are Sunni Muslims, but over content. Both types can occur simulta-
neously, but not necessarily so.
As already mentioned, the number of religious conﬂicts in sub-Saharan Africa has
increased, especially when we look at the share of all conﬂicts and recent years. The main
increase can be traced back to theological conﬂicts, while the share of interreligious conﬂicts
has been more stable (see Basedau 2017). Notorious examples are the Islamist Tuareg
rebellion since 2012 in Mali, the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria and the conﬂict with the
Al-Shabaab militia in Somalia. There are less known cases. In the Democratic Republic of
Congo, the Bundu dia Kongo has demanded a religious state based on a syncretic form of
Christianity. The Lord’s Resistance Army that originates in Uganda originally held Christian
demands, which arguably, have never been very salient. Other conﬂicts show a strong
interreligious dimension, partially in conjunction with ‘theological’ incompatibilities. The
Sudanese civil war was a showcase of howMuslims and Christians (and Animists) clashed in
bloody confrontations. Massive bloodshed between Christians and Muslims has haunted
the CAR since 2013. In Ethiopia, a Christian-dominated government is ﬁghting a number of
predominantly Muslim rebel groups.
By intuition and according to relative deprivation theory (Gurr 1970), we would
expect that religious discrimination may lead to armed conﬂict, especially those
with religious overtones. Table 1 plots the levels of discrimination against the
occurrence of religious and other armed conﬂicts for the period of 1990–2014
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(See also Table A1 in the Appendix). We can spot a tendency that more religious
discrimination coincides with more armed conﬂict. Out of 462 countries, more than
70% conform to such an expectation. Twenty countries show neither discrimination
nor any conﬂict. Another eight cases have suﬀered from a conﬂict, but not a
religious one and we do not expect that religious discrimination is necessarily
connected to other conﬂicts. Six cases have at least moderate levels of religious
discrimination and religious armed conﬂicts. Among them are notorious cases such
as Sudan, Somalia and Nigeria. However, a dozen of countries do not conform to
our assumptions. In the Comoros, religious discrimination is very high, but only a
non-religious armed conﬂict occurred. Even more puzzling are 11 war prone coun-
tries with rather low levels of discrimination and armed religious conﬂicts. Cases
include Angola, Chad, CAR and the Côte d’Ivoire (interreligious conﬂicts) and the
high-proﬁle case of Mali (theological conﬂict).
Religious discrimination as a driver of religious armed conﬂict: a multilevel
analysis
The descriptive overview in the previous section fuels the suspicion that religious
discrimination may indeed increase the likelihood of religious armed conﬂict.
Theoretically, and as argued above, the relative deprivation thesis is a plausible explana-
tion of such a relationship (Gurr 1970). Fox and colleagues summarise the theory as
follows: ‘Relative deprivation theory argues that when members of a group compare
their situation with some point of comparison and ﬁnd their situation lacking, this leads
to frustration which, in turn, may lead to political organizing, violence, or unrest’ (Fox,
Bader, and McClure 2017, 2). Discrimination of religious groups can form such a point of
comparison: when religious groups are not free in practising their faith, frustration may
turn into aggression, ﬁnally leading to armed conﬂict, and not unlikely in the form of a
religious incompatibility. However, religious and other armed conﬂicts can result from
many causes and the causal mechanisms may include complex interactions of them. In
Table 1. Level of religious discrimination and prevalence of religious and other armed conﬂict,
1990–2014.
No armed conﬂict
Only non-religious armed
conﬂict Religious armed conﬂict
Low discrimination (0–
10) according to RAS3
data
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Cape Verde,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya,
Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Namibia, South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe
(N = 20)
Burundi, Guinea-Bissau,
Lesotho, Mozambique,
Niger, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, South Sudan
(N = 8)
Angola**, CAR**, Chad,
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire**, DR
Congo, Guinea**,
Liberia**, Mali*,
Senegal**, Uganda
(N = 11)
Moderate discrimination
(10–19)
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria,
Somalia* (N = 4)
High discrimination (>19) Comoros
(N = 1)
Mauritania*, Sudan (N = 2)
Note: Countries sorted by average degree of religious discrimination between 1990 and 2014 and onset of (religious)
armed conﬂict; *only theological armed conﬂict, **only interreligious armed conﬂict; countries in bold were selected
for the comparative case studies (typical and deviant cases). Source for discrimination: RAS3 data.
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addition, discrimination may take many forms, may or may not result in grievances and
these grievances can lead to protest or not and dissent may take various violent or
nonviolent forms. In what follows, we will take a two-level approach to dig deeper into
the relationship between religious discrimination and religious armed conﬂicts. We will
ﬁrst engage in a multivariate preliminary regression analysis of the causes, with control-
ling for other potential drivers of conﬂict. Then we will have a closer look at a sample of
countries that diﬀer with regard to the operative variables but show otherwise a number
of similarities than can be excluded to explain their diﬀerences.
Multivariate logistic regression
We ﬁrst employ multivariate logistic regressions to estimate whether or not religious
discrimination is a signiﬁcant correlate of religious and other armed conﬂicts in sub-
Saharan Africa for the period 1990–2014. Our main dependent variable is armed conﬂict
that takes the value 1 when we observe an intrastate incompatibility between the state
and at least one non-state group that claimed at least 25 battle related death in one
calendar year. Data and deﬁnitions are taken from the UCDP/PRIO armed conﬂict dataset
(e.g. Themnér and Wallensteen 2014). Building on this dataset we use information on
the two types of religious conﬂicts that form the other two dependent variables. Both
variables are taken from the Religion and Rebels dataset (see Basedau 2017). As an
interreligious conﬂict we deﬁne an armed conﬂict in which warring factions diﬀer by
their religious identity group, e.g. Muslims and Christians. A theological conﬂict is an
armed conﬂict in which the warring factions diﬀer regarding the role of the religion in
the state. For instance, rebels hold religious demands that are incompatible with the
state. Both variables take the value 1 when we observe such a characteristic of an armed
conﬂict and 0 otherwise. The chief independent variable is taken from the RAS3 dataset
and summarises all scores of individual discriminations per year per country. The vari-
able’s values range from 0 to 44, with 44 representing the actual maximum.3
In order to account for important confounding factors that can equally inﬂuence the
occurrence of violent conﬂict (Hegre and Sambanis 2006) or religious armed conﬂict
(Basedau, Pfeiﬀer, and Johannes 2016), we add a number of pertinent control variables
to the models. All data were taken from the RCDC dataset (Vüllers, Pfeiﬀer, and Basedau
2015). First, we add two variables that may increase the likelihood of religious conﬂict.
The binary variable ethnic overlap describes whether religious and ethnic boundaries
between groups are signiﬁcantly parallel. Such ethnic overlaps are common in many
countries, especially in countries with Muslim and Christian population shares. Economic
overlap is also a binary variable and indicates horizontal inequalities between groups
that is when economic wealth is not equally distributed between groups. Three addi-
tional variables are more regular drivers of conﬂict. GDPPPCS describes income per
capita in purchasing power parities. Population indicates the size of the population.
Population size regularly increases conﬂict risks while higher income is generally
assumed to decrease the occurrence of violence. Given highly skewed values, we logged
both variables.
We also added land area which describes the total area of a country. Countries with more
land area should also bemoreprone to conﬂict. As religious discriminationmight be a function
of regime type we ﬁnally included a measure of democratisation levels using polity2 data.
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Table 2 summarises the results of our regression analyses for the three dependent
variables in sub-Saharan Africa. It becomes apparent that religious discrimination
robustly increases the risk of the prevalence of all conﬂict types. The same holds true
for land area and ethnic overlap, the latter showing a possibly even bigger impact.
Economic overlap and GDP per capita only matter for all armed conﬂict and interreli-
gious conﬂicts and both decrease the likelihood of conﬂicts. This is no surprise for
income, but somewhat unexpected for the economic overlap. A democratic regime
type seems also to reduce the prevalence of conﬂicts in general. The overall explanatory
power of the models seems acceptable, especially for the two models on religious
conﬂicts as a dependent variable.
The results are less convincing when we look at onsets of religious and other armed
conﬂicts (Table 3). This is no surprise as onsets aremore rare events compared to prevalence
which counts all active years of a given conﬂict. The models lose overall explanatory power
(measured by R-squared values) and religious discrimination turns out to be signiﬁcant only
for theological armed conﬂicts, and at a lower levels of statistical signiﬁcance. The most
important variables seem to be ethnic overlaps and a vast land area, which are the only
variables that are consistently signiﬁcant across all models.
We also tested to what extent religious discrimination can explain religious and other
armed conﬂicts worldwide, applying the same models. Results for the worldwide sample
conﬁrm (see Table A2 in the Appendix) that religious discrimination only matters for
theological conﬂicts.4 Overall, according to our results, religious discrimination is not the
main driver of religious conﬂict.
Table 2. Prevalence of (religious) armed conﬂict in sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2014.
Armed conﬂict Theological armed conﬂict Interreligious armed conﬂict
Religious discrimination +++ +++ +++
Ethnic overlap +++ +++ +++
Economic overlap -
Regime type (polity2) – – –
GDP p.c. (log) – –
Population size (log)
Land area +++ +++ +++
R squared 0.22 0.30 0.23
Note: Signs (-/+) indicate direction, number of signs indicate level of signiﬁcance (10%/5%/1% of likelihood that results
are random). Full regression tables available in the Appendix, Figure A1.
Table 3. Onset of (religious) armed conﬂict in sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2014.
Armed conﬂict Theological armed conﬂict Interreligious armed conﬂict
Religious discrimination ++
Ethnic overlap ++ ++ +++
Economic overlap +
Regime type (polity2)
GDP p.c. (log) –
Population size (log)
Land area ++ +++ +++
R squared 0.02 0.02 0.01
Note: Signs (-/+) indicate direction, number of signs indicate level of signiﬁcance (10%/5%/1% likelihood that results
are random). Full regression tables available in the Appendix, Figure A2.
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Comparative case studies
Qualitative analysis has the advantage of being able to identify variables and relation-
ships that might be overlooked in quantitative analysis. It can also trace and thus
capture the dynamic character of causal mechanisms. However, choosing qualitative
methods should not be an excuse for low standards in methodology. The late Giovanni
Sartori has warned that a major shortcoming in comparison is the lack of purpose
(Sartori 1991). We hence clarify that the main purpose of the following comparative
endeavour is to investigate how religious discrimination and religious armed conﬂicts
are related – and in particular what other variables inform the relationship and are at
play in these mechanisms.
Controlled comparison requires careful case selection which must follow pertinent
criteria (ibid., Seawright and Gerring 2008). Our logic of the case selection is an approx-
imate most similar system that combines typical and deviant cases. First, we look at
cases that diﬀer with regard to theological conﬂict; we selected the presence or non-
presence of theological conﬂict as the principal form of conﬂict because religious
discrimination has proven robust exclusively for this type of conﬂict in the large N
analysis. We select two cases that are typical for the assumed relationship but diﬀer
with regard to outcome and independent variable. If the relationship is – even partially –
valid, we should ﬁnd that religious discrimination – or its absence – is indeed crucial in
causal mechanisms that link or do not link discrimination to theological armed conﬂict.
We compare these two cases to two deviant cases that display either high or low
religious discrimination but are not connected to the expected outcome. In choosing
our cases, we also consider context and try to hold a number of contextual variables
constant, in what comes close to a most similar systems design (Sartori 1991). In order to
exclude surrounding variables from explaining diﬀerences, we are able to isolate actual
relationships and render our causal inferences more valid.5 These contextual conditions
are ethnic overlap, income per capita, and population size. The bar lies high for a perfect
sample in the sense of a most similar systems design, but we could identify four cases
that are similar in these aspects: the absence of an ethnic overlap (religiously being
rather homogenously Muslim), low income per capita, and a relatively low population
size. These cases are the Comoros, the Gambia, Mali and Mauritania. In the latter two,
theological conﬂicts broke out, but only in Mauritania religious discrimination has
reached high levels. In the Gambia, we observe the expected absence of religious
discrimination and conﬂict; in the Comoros, religious discrimination is high, but there
has not been an onset of a religious armed conﬂict. There was a minor non-religious
armed conﬂict in 1997, and one can argue that it would have been more appropriate to
choose a case without any organised violence. However, there is none (see Table 2).6 An
alternative to Mauritania (high discrimination and religious conﬂict) would have been
Sudan, but we decided against this case given that there has been an ongoing religious
conﬂict in 1990, the beginning of the period under investigation, which would have
made it impossible to really compare the causes of the onset of the conﬂict.
We start our analysis with the typical case of Mauritania. In Mauritania the onset of an
armed conﬂict with a theological incompatibility in 2010 was expected due to the high
levels of religious discrimination. At ﬁrst glance, the obvious causal mechanism – discussed
above – is that restrictions placed on religious minorities (not placed on the majority)
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motivate the minority to rebel. Yet, this mechanism is not at work. The predominantly
Muslim country has Islam as its state religion and RAS3 data show that discrimination
includes disadvantages for the small minorities that are not Muslim. The onset of a
theological armed conﬂict, however, occurred in 2010 in which the government confronted
AQIM (Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb), a transnational Islamist group active in large parts
of North Africa and the Sahel. In response to increasing terrorist attacks by AQIM, kidnap-
pings and small-scale ﬁghting on Mauritanian soil, Mauritania’s army attacked AQIM in July
and September 2010 on Mali’s territory in 2010 (BTI 2012). AQIM attacked Mauritania a
couple of times in 2011 deeper insideMauritanian territory (UCDP 2017) and in the capital in
an attempt to kill the Mauritanian president (Goita 2011).
Factors that fuelled the conﬂict between the government and AQIM in 2010–2011 are
related to social, economic and political hierarchies and inequalities in the country.
Discrimination of ethnic minorities, mostly non-Arabic speaking ethnic groups (and
former slaves) as well as popular discontent over poverty, unemployment and a rising
terrorist threat have fuelled grievances and anger of diﬀerent social groups towards the
government (Boukhars 2016; BTI 2012; Rao 2014). Various large-scale demonstrations in
2011 – potentially inspired by the Arab Spring – reﬂected these threats to government
legitimacy (Moctar 2013; Rao 2014).
Government legitimacy was also questioned due to non-democratic political transitions
and the engagement of government oﬃcials in illicit economic activities (BTI 2014; Jourde
2011). At the same time, the government-promoted (and partly Saudi/Gulf-funded)
‘Arabisation’ of, for instance, education has opened the doors for Salaﬁ ideas to enter the
country. These strengthened on the one hand the anger of non-Arabic speaking groups in
Mauritania and translated on the other hand into ‘ever-more-public display of austere piety
and in rising social pressures for conformity to ritual purity and rigid religious command-
ments’ (Boukhars 2012; BTI 2012; Rao 2014). These dynamics created the basis for extremists
to radicalise youth in the country and establish their presence within Mauritania (Boukhars
2016; Jourde 2011; Rao 2014). For instance, the two only suicide bombers inMauritania were
Haratine, the most discriminated ethnic group.
However, we cannot ﬁnd a direct connection between discrimination and the armed
conﬂict. The strong religious discrimination against the Christian minority obviously did
not have a noteworthy impact on these dynamics. The mechanism seems indirect and
resembles an argument put forward by Nilay Saiya (Saiya 2017). Rather, the grip on
radical interpretations of Islam by the state has strengthened the threat by radical
Islamist groups by legitimising their cause. Religious discrimination plays a role in that
it is one element of a discriminatory and authoritarian state in Mauritania (BTI 2014,
2012; Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor 2013a). However, a more impor-
tant factor for the conﬂict has been outside inﬂuences, through ideas from Saudi Arabia
and in the concrete form of AQIM.
Unlike its neighbour Mauritania, Mali has not had substantial religious discrimination
before 2012, when a major conﬂict, including Islamist rebels, broke out in the north of
the country. Mali experienced upsurges in the Tuareg territory before. This time, how-
ever, it proved to be more severe and had strong religious overtones. What may explain
the onset despite the absence of religious discrimination? A review of the literature on
Mali’s conﬂict in 2012 boils down to one central element that is related to other social,
political and economic drivers of conﬂict: Mali’s north-south inequalities, tensions and
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grievances that run along ethnic lines. Despite its culture of tolerance and integration of
a variety of diﬀerent social groups, Mali’s North and South face great divisions. These
include economic and political marginalisation of the North (Chauzal and van Damme
2015), a failure to ensure eﬀective decentralised accountability and governance, divide-
and-rule instruments/opportunistic exploitation of ethnic divisions by government
(Chauzal and Thibault 2015), a government collusion with AQIM and organised crime
(Lacher 2012), a lack of implementation of peace agreements with predominantly
Tuareg separatists (Lind and Dowd 2015); as well as international interference that
after 9/11 focused on security, while ignoring equal development of the country
(Chauzal and Thibault 2015).
Overall, these factors have divided North and South Mali and caused resentment and
grievances over decades (e.g. Dowd and Raleigh 2013). Radical Islamist groups in the
North beneﬁtted from this division, becoming the main political opposition force and
cooperating with and then marginalising secular separatists. Less apparent causes of
conﬂict include the impact of the Arab Spring/the fall of the Libyan regime, as Tuareg
who previously served in the Libyan armed forces joined the rebellion in Mali with a
massive inﬂux of weapons and ammunition (e.g. Dowd and Raleigh 2013). Second,
scholars discuss the role of the vastness of Mali’s territory that put challenges to the
eﬀective governance of the North and created vast, remote, ungoverned or misgov-
erned areas and enable rebels to operate in the ﬁrst place (Guichanqua 2013). In sum, an
ethnic conﬂict was hijacked by transnationally active Islamist rebels, partly the very same
group as in Mauritania. The religious character of the conﬂict is rather unrelated to
domestic politics in Mali, perhaps except the weakness of the Malian state that made the
country vulnerable to the inﬂux of more radical Islamist ideas and insurgents.
It is somewhat a challenge to explain the absence of a violent conﬂict. In the case of the
Gambia we will try to ﬁnd out whether it was due to the low levels of religious discrimina-
tion. From 1994 to 2017, the Gambia, a small West African country, almost entirely
surrounded by Senegal, was ruled by Yayha Jammeh, who had come to power in a military
coup in 1994. The absence of armed conﬂict is not necessarily marked by ‘positive peace’ in
the Gambia. Under Jammeh’s rule, the country has experienced a repressive regime
characterised by human rights abuses and intimidation of political opponents and the
population at large (Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor 2013b; Darboe 2010;
Wright 2007). Yet, due to a weak military, at least compared to its much more powerful
neighbour Senegal, the country has historically engaged in diplomatic instead of military
means to resolve conﬂicts, given the constant threat that a foreign military could easily
dominate the Gambia armed forces. Presence of Senegalese military in the Gambia has
shown this in the past (Hartmann 2017; Wiseman 1996). Senegal and Senegalese military
forces were also critical in ousting Jammeh. In 2016, Jammeh was defeated in free and fair
elections and had to be forced to eventually accept his defeat.
Importantly, the ethnically diverse country does not show the same sociopolitical
divisions along ethnic lines as Mauritania or Mali. Rather, long-standing peaceful rela-
tions between ethnic groups and the absence of clear regional divisions between them
have rendered ethnic identity and allegiances less important. It has been reported that
Gambians feel more connected to fellow Gambians of diﬀerent ethnicities than to
people of their own ethnicity in other countries (Senghor 2008; Wiseman 1996).
Religious freedom is enshrined in the Gambia’s constitution and cherished in the
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population where intermarriage is accepted and practised (Bureau of Democracy Human
Rights and Labor 2016a).
In addition, and perhaps crucially, there has not been the emergence or inﬂux of
radical Islamist groups into the country compared to Mali and Mauritania. President
Jammeh, who was considered a protégé of the late Muammar Gaddaﬁ, received funds
from Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and considered to introduce Shari’a law (Minority
Rights Group International 2008). But he did not take this action in the time under
scrutiny (1990–2014), he announced the Gambia in 2015 as an Islamic state only. In its
aftermath a slight increase in intolerance was noted, based on diﬀerent interpretations
of Islam (Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor 2016a). Eﬀects of this move will
remain unknown. After Jammeh’s demise in 2016, the risk of rising Islamism, fuelled by
the government itself, is more likely to be reduced again.
The case of the Comoros islands constitutes the perhaps most interesting case. The
archipelago is religiously similarly homogenous as the other cases. 98% of Comorians
are Sunni Muslims. While the Constitution does not proclaim Islam as the oﬃcial religion
of the country, the government discourages the practice of other religions, and the
constitution says in its preamble that citizens will draw principles and rules that will
govern the country from Muslim religious tenets (Bureau of Democracy Human Rights
and Labor 2014). There is apparently discrimination of Christians including reports of
forced attendance of services in mosques. Recently, concerns have emerged about
radicalisation due to students studying the Islam abroad and bringing more radical
practices back into the country. The Comoros established a law on regulating religious
practices to avoid radicalisation, social unrest or the undermining of national unity
(Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor 2014).
Despite a rather ethnically and religiously homogenous society, where Islam is perceived
as a strong unifying element, the Comoros have experienced decades of political division
and instability (Ayangafac 2008). A lack of agreement on power-sharing structures between
the islands, amultitude of coup d’états and secession attempts have destabilised the country
(Bureau of African Aﬀairs 2012; Mohadji 2005; Mouhssini, Dhakoine, and Chei 2011; Taglioni
2010). While Christians and other non-Islamic religions are strongly discriminated against,
division of the country is rather due to the separation of the country in islands and elites,
which questions a shared national identity and the nationhood of the Comoros (Poupko
2017). In a context of extreme poverty, diﬀerences in terms of economic power among the
islands and the distribution of recourses have caused tensions against the union govern-
ment and among the islands (Baker 2009).
Political discontent is an element that the Comoros share with all other country cases.
With Mali it shares particularly the secessionist tendencies that have caused armed
conﬂict in the past. However, these fault lines are again along islands boundaries rather
than ethnic or religious lines. The absence of religious armed conﬂict, despite numerous
coup d’états and political instability, could be explained by the weakness of radical
Islamist groups and – to a lesser extent – the limited inﬂux of radical Islamist ideologies
over the years under scrutiny; it is not unlikely that the divisions and perceived inequal-
ities among the Comoros islands could be mobilised along radical Islamist ideologies. In
fact, the country recognises that the above-mentioned recent inﬂux of more radical
interpretations of Islam through foreign-educated students of Islam could constitute a
future source of destabilisation (Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor 2014).
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But unlike Mali, the Comoros is separated from all other countries by the Indian Ocean,
making it diﬃcult for outside (Islamist) military to further destabilise the country.
What can be learned from these short comparative case studies? The answer is simple:
religious discrimination by itself has not caused religious armed conﬂict. Discrimination is
partly explaining problems in Mauritania and the absence thereof in the Gambia but
apparently discriminations does not form a direct cause, but is rather embedded in
society–religion relations that under certain conditions lead to conﬂict – or do not. The
comparison of Mali, Mauritania, the Gambia and the Comoros in contrast suggest that
(theological) religious armed conﬂicts are related to the combination of three major factors
(see Table 4).
First, it depends on whether intergroup tensions exist and to what extent they can be
mobilised along religious lines. This argument has two components. On the one hand, group-
related tensions must pre-exist. In that regard, we could argue that more pronounced ethnic–
racial hierarchies and marginalisation were present in Mali and Mauritania. These play a less
important role in the Gambia. The case of the Comoros is up to discussion as there are severe
tensions between the diﬀerent islands. One might argue that such identity-related tensions
do exist in the Comoros. This might be the reason for the non-religious armed conﬂict.
The question then, on the other hand, is under what conditions intergroup tensions
are mobilised along religious lines, the other component of the argument. The religious
homogeneity of the Gambia does not constitute a convincing explanation because in all
four cases the population is virtually homogeneously Sunni Muslim. The diﬀerence is
about the form and intensity of inﬂuence of radical religious ideologies. While all four
cases are subject to more radical ideological inﬂuences, mainly from the Arab world, Mali
and Mauritania suﬀer from strong and concrete transnational inﬂuences in the form of
religious armed groups – not just ideas – from which both the Gambia and the Comoros
were better protected.
At this stage, geography comes into play. The Gambia is surrounded by Senegal and
the Comoros are an archipelago with strong natural barriers to incursions by outsiders.
Table 4. Overview of comparative case studies.
Mauritania Mali Comoros The Gambia
Religious
discrimination
High Low High Low
Religious armed
conﬂict
Yes (theological) Yes (theological) No No
Expected
outcome
Yes No (Deviant) Yes (Deviant) No
Explanation of
actual
outcome
State Islamism, ethnic
and racial tensions
fuel militant
Islamism; trans-
nationally active
Islamist groups
enter the vast
territory → religious
armed conﬂict in
which state
discrimination is
part of problematic
state-religion
relations
Existing separatist
tensions are
‘hijacked’ by
transnational and
local Jihadist;
facilitated by vast
territory and
stronger military
rebel capacity →
religious armed
conﬂict despite low
discrimination
Transnational inﬂuence
limited by status as
archipelago; small
and isolated
territory; tensions
between islands are
not mobilized along
religious lines →
only non-religious
armed conﬂict
despite high levels
of religious
discrimination
Transnational
inﬂuence limited
by dominance of
Senegal; small
territory; no ethnic
or other tensions
Islamist could
draw on → no
religious conﬂict
(unlikely even with
higher
discrimination)
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The size and the geography of the country apparently play a non-negligible role.
Mauritania and Mali are huge countries that face diﬃculties to govern more remote
areas accountably and eﬀectively. In these areas the radical Islamist groups were able to
attack the government and population and establish some control. The Gambia and the
Comoros are for simple geographical reasons less prone to outside inﬂuences.
Conclusion
This contribution has used new data on religious discrimination from the new RAS3 data
and on religious armed conﬂicts to reinvestigate the potential eﬀect of religious dis-
crimination on religious armed conﬂict in sub-Saharan Africa. The contribution has
drawn on the relative deprivation thesis and ﬁrst outlined patterns and trends in
religious discrimination and conﬂict on the basis of RAS3 data. We then engaged in a
statistical analysis of all sub-Saharan countries and then moved on to a comparative
analysis of country cases that show many similarities but diﬀer with regard to the levels
of religious discrimination and the occurrence of religious armed conﬂict (the Comoros,
the Gambia, Mali and Mauritania). The dual level analysis yields three main results. First,
religious discrimination has been increasing over the last 15 years but in interregional
comparison sub-Saharan Africa has a surprisingly low level of discrimination. Second, at
the cross-country level there is a signiﬁcant correlation between religious discrimination
and the emergence of theological conﬂict (but not other types of conﬂict). Third, looking
closer at the four pertinent country cases reveals that discrimination is not the obvious
driver of religious conﬂicts, even in cases with high discrimination. High levels of
discrimination are rather embedded in a wider context of problematic state-religion
relations which may fuel the rise of religious extremists. However, more importantly,
conﬂict is best explained by existing (principally non-religious) group tensions that
become mobilised along religious lines. The escalation to religious violent conﬂict is
related to geography. Outside inﬂux of radical ideas is detectable in all cases, but vast
territory and open borders create opportunity for outside incursions by armed militant
groups from which small countries or islands are much better protected.
Our contribution contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, we
reinvestigate an important relationship for the region sub-Sahara Africa where religious
conﬂicts have increased but have remained under-researched. Second, we conﬁrm that
there is no simple connection between objective (religious) discrimination and violent
conﬂict (e.g. Fox, Bader, and McClure 2017). Third, we show that religious discrimination
can contribute to ‘religious’ conﬂict, when taking into account contextual conditions and
not so obvious, indirect causal mechanisms (see Saiya 2017). This contribution under-
scores that we must understand the wider context of the countries.
We should particularly pay more attention to factors that make countries, groups and
individuals vulnerable to extremist ideologies; and to transnational inﬂuences that can
haunt countries from outside. At the same time, we should be cautious to draw too far
reaching conclusions from our results. Further studies need to look more in-depth into
the sociology of the emergence of religious conﬂicts and their interaction with secular
social and political factors. We have focused on sub-Saharan Africa and we should not
take it for granted that these results are the same globally. We should be also aware that
the RAS3 dataset looks at the core of religion and records more or less those forms of
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discrimination that relate directly to religious practice; under some circumstances,
political and economic exclusion or societal discrimination might be more important.
Finally, we studied the country level, but more ﬁne-grained data may reveal more. This
can be at the sub-regional or the group level and should also include individual and
experimental data. All these challenges require further eﬀorts to study the eﬀects of
religious discrimination and the causes of religious armed conﬂicts.
Notes
1. One may argue that this ﬁnding might be due to a lack of information compared to other
countries with more coverage by reports. However, it is unlikely that severe discrimination
remains undetected.
2. Two countries have less than 500,000 inhabitants and are not included in the RAS3 dataset.
Djibouti is counted as a Middle East country.
3. Theoretically, much higher values are possible (Fox 2011).
4. Interestingly, economic overlap is a driver conﬂict worldwide unlike in Africa.
5. This has a downside as we will be unable to assess the eﬀects of those constant variables.
However, the advantages trump the disadvantages.
6. We might argue that this already support the idea that discrimination causes armed conﬂict.
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Appendix
Table A1. Average discrimination and religious and other armed conﬂict by country.
Country
Average
discrimination
(1990–2014)
according to RAS3
data Trend Armed conﬂict
Theological armed
conﬂict
(incompatibility:
content)
Interreligious armed
conﬂict
(incompatibility:
identity)
Angola 5 1990–2002; 2004;
2007; 2009
1990–1995;
1998–2002
Benin 0
Botswana 1
Burkina Faso 0
Burundi 0 1991–1992;
1994–2006; 2008
Cameroon 0
Cape Verde 0
Central
African
Republic
1 2001–2002; 2006;
2009–2013
2002; 2006;
2009–2013
Chad 4 1990–1994;
1997–2003;
2005–2010
1992–1994 1992–1994;
1997–1998
Comoros 27 1997
Congo 0 1993; 1997–1999;
2002
1993; 1998–1999;
2002
1993; 1997–1999;
2002
Cote d’Ivoire 2 2002–2004; 2011 2002–2004; 2011
Democratic
Republic
of the
Congo
0 1996–2001;
2006–2008;
2011–2014
2007–2008; 2013 1996–2000;
2006–2008;
2012–2014
Equatorial
Guinea
1
Eritrea 17 1997; 1999; 2003 1997; 1999; 2003 1997; 1999; 2003
Ethiopia 12 1990–1996;
1998–2014
1993; 1996; 1999 1990–1996;
1998–2014
Gabon 2
Gambia 1
Ghana 2
Guinea 2 2000–2001 2000–2001
Guinea-
Bissau
0 1998–1999
Kenya 6
Lesotho 0 1998
Liberia 0 1990; 2000–2003 2000–2003
Madagascar 6
Malawi 8
Mali 1 1990; 1994;
2007–2009;
2012–2014
2012–2013
Mauritania 19 2010–2011 2010–2011
Mauritius 2
(Continued )
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Table A1. (Continued).
Country
Average
discrimination
(1990–2014)
according to RAS3
data Trend Armed conﬂict
Theological armed
conﬂict
(incompatibility:
content)
Interreligious armed
conﬂict
(incompatibility:
identity)
Mozambique 3 1990–1992; 2013
Namibia 0
Niger 0 1991–1992;
1994–1995; 1997;
2007–2008
Nigeria 15 2004; 2009;
2011–2014
2004; 2009;
2011–2014
2004; 2009;
2011–2014
Rwanda 4 1990–1994;
1996–2002;
2009–2012
Sao Tome
and
Principe
No data No data
Senegal 0 1990; 1992–1993;
1995; 1997–1998;
2000–2001; 2003;
2011
1990; 1992–1993;
1995; 1997–1998;
2000–2001; 2003;
2011
Seychelles No data No data
Sierra Leone 0 1991–2001
Somalia 14 1990–1996;
2001–2002;
2006–2014
2006–2013
South Africa 0
South Sudan 0 2011–2014
Sudan 42 1990–2014 1990–2013 1990–2004;
2010–2011
Swaziland 1
Tanzania 2
Togo 5
Uganda 7 1990–1992;
1994–2011;
2013–2014
1990–1991;
1994–1998;
2000–2006;
2008–2011;
2013–2014
1990–1992;
1996–2002; 2007;
2010–2011;
2013–2014
Zambia 1
Zimbabwe 3
Table A2. Prevalence/onset of (religious) armed conﬂict worldwide, 1990–2014.
Armed conﬂict Theological armed conﬂict Interreligious armed conﬂict
Religious discrimination ns/ns +++/+++ ns/ns
Ethnic overlap +++/ns ns/++ +++/+++
Economic overlap +++/ns +++/ns +++/ns
Regime type (polity2) –/– ns/ns –/ns
GDP p.c. (log) –/– –/– +++/ns
Population size (log) +++/++ s +++/+++ +++/ns
Land area –/ns ns/ns –s/ns
R squared 0.07/0.08 0.12/0.02 0.15/0.02
Signs (-/+) indicate direction, number of signs indicate level of signiﬁcance (10%/5%/1%); ns = not signiﬁcant. Original
regression tables available upon request.
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Figure A1. Prevalence of theological armed conﬂict in sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2014.
Figure A2. Onset of theological armed conﬂict in sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2014.
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